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THE MARQuETrE LAW REVIEW
should be a sufficient reservation. 9 It does not seem that the addition
of the actual words of reservation on the old note should be essential
to enable the bank to controvert the accommodation party's defense.
But it has been held that the retention of the note is not enough.40 This
appears to be a sacrifice of substance to form. In view of the judicial
notice taken of the bookkeeping transaction itself the courts should
also recognize that the retention in the bank's files of the past due
note whether marked "collateral" or not can only be for purposes of
security. This note has no security value "per se" in the sense that
other collateral securities have value. What other security can it give
than a right to proceed against the parties whose names appear on it
and not on the renewal note? The judicial attitude on this subject is
but a further revelation of how technical the law tends to become on
almost every aspect of this problem.
CLIFFoRD A. RANDALL.
FIRE INSURANcE-CLAUSE AGAINST CHATTEL MORTGAGES-EFFECT
OF VOID CHATTEL MORTGAGE AS MORAL HAZARD.-The standard fire
insurance policy for Wisconsin' contains a provision that the insurer
shall not be liable for loss or damage to any personal property covered
by the policy while encumbered by a chattel mortgage unless otherwise
provided by agreement.2 In the case of Mielke v. National Reserve Ins.
Co.3 the insurance company, contending that the insured had placed a
chattel mortgage on some of the property covered by the policy, sought
to have that property excluded from the protection of the policy. The
insured countered with the contention that the chattel mortgage was in-
effective and void4 and that therefore the provision was not applicable.
While the court found that the chattel mortgage was effective at the
time of loss and that therefore the property included therein
was excluded from the protection of the policy, it further
added that, if it had been obliged to hold the chattel mortgage
ineffective and void, the property described in the instrument would,
3" But see Citizens State Bank of Cohnan v. Rosenwald, (S.D. 1934) 256 N.W.
264. "The reservation of rights against the surety must be express and definite
however, and the creditor must not only retain the original instrument of in-
debtedness but must expressly reserve the right of immediate action thereon
at least against the surety."40National Park Bank v. Koehler, 204 N.Y. 174, 97 N.E. 468 (1912) ; Citizens
State Bank of Cohnan v. Rosenwald, (S.D. 1934) 256 N.W. 264. Cited n. 39
supra.
2 Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.01.
2 Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.01 lines 62 to 67 inclusive, "unless otherwise provided
by agreement * * * this company shall not be liable for loss or damage to any
property insured hereunder while incumbered by a chattel mortgage **
3 (Wis. 1934) 256 N.W. 776.
4 The chattel mortgage covered property which would have been subject to
exemption if such exemption had been claimed and the mortgagor's wife not
having joined in the mortgage would have the right to claim such exemption.
Since she had not claimed such exemption (and she had no reason to do so)
before the time of the fire loss the court decided that the mortgage was effec-
tive to all the property covered thereby.
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nevertheless, be exempted from the protection of the policy.' Since
such a statement by the court might subsequently be deemed authorita-
tive,6 what might be the basis for the court's declaration becomes im-
portant.
The theory adopted7 in the Mielke case is: part of the risk assumed
by the insurer is moral risk; what is good moral risks may so cease to
be if the property subject to the policy be or become encumbered by a
chattel mortgage; the chattel mortgage provision is inserted in the
policy to protect the insurer from the lessening of the insured's interest9
in the property; even if the mortgage be invalid, and its invalidity be
unknown to the insured, the effect on the moral risk will be the same as
if the mortgage were effective.10 This theory resolves itself into three
main classifications: one, the relationship between moral hazard" and
chattel mortgages; two, the purpose of the chattel mortgage provision;
three, the construction of that provision.
Moral hazard is described as the pecuniary interest in the insured
to permit the property to burn, 2 or the possibility of loss by fires of
incendiary origin, 3 or risk, danger or probability that the insured will
destroy or permit to be destroyed the insured property in order to
collect the insurance.' 4 It has been said that the moral hazard 5 is least
when the pecuniary interest of the insured in the protection of the
property against fire is greatest and that the moral hazard is greatest
when the insured may gain most by the burning of the property.' The
5See Mielke v. National Reserve Ins. Co., (Wis. 1934) 256 N.W. 776, 777.
6 Chase v. American Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 186 N.W. 598 (1922). See Will
of Hawkinson, 143 Wis. 136, 126 N.W. 683 (1910).
7 "Adopted" is used because the Wisconsin Court relied upon the theory set
forth in Lipedes v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co., 229 N.Y. 201, 128 N.E. 160, 13
A.L.R. 556 (1920).
8 Moral hazard is that term which is used to describe the thing which creates
the risk. See BLACK, LAW DicrioNARY (3rd ed.). Hence it may be deduced that
moral risk is measured by moral hazard and for practical purposes the terms
are synonomous.
9 Interest is apparently used to connote that feeling which an owner of personal
property has toward the property which causes him to take care of it and
protect it from destruction.
10 The terms effective, invalid and void, have been used indiscriminatingly. In fact
however they describe the instrument termed a chattel mortgage as one having
no legal efficacy between the parties to such instrument.
"1 While the court in the Mielke case used the term "moral risk" it is suggested
that moral hazard is more generally used. See BLAcK, LAW DIcrIONARY (3rd
ed.).
12 See Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 27 U.S. 25, 49, 7 L.Ed. 335 (1829) ; Con-
necticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 160 Fed. 382, 385, 15 Ann. Cas. 338 (C.C.A.
8th, 1908); Johnson v. Sun Fire Ins. Co., 3 Ga. App. 430, 60 S.E. 118, 119
(1908) ; Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, 167 Ind. 659, 74 N.E. 964, 972 (1905).
13 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Dorroh, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 133 S.W.
465, 468 (1911).
'4 See Davenport v. Firemans Ins. Co., 47 S.D. 426, 199 N.W. 203 (1924).
1 5 Moral hazard may be more than just pecuniary interest to permit the property
to burn. Such items as character, habits as a careful and prudent man or
reverse, known integrity or bad reputation can be elements distinct from
"pecuniary interest." See BLAC<, LAv DicroNARY (3rd ed.).
16 See Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 Fed 165, 170 (C.C.A. 8th, 1894) ; Schwmitsch
v. Anerican Ins. Co., 48 Wis. 26, 29, 3 N.W. 595 (1879).
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roots of the thought behind such definitions may be found in the an-
cient requirement of insurable interest.'7
In considering the relationship between moral hazard and chattel
mortgages, it is of assistance to first consider the relationship between
moral hazard and real estate mortgages as the definitions of moral
hazard are sufficiently broad to cover either class. In the Wisconsin fire
policy there is no provision directly covering the effect of the mort-
gagor's subsequently encumbering the insured realty.'8 If such was
done it would not violate the provision relating to unconditional and
sole ownership 9 nor the provision relating to change in interest, title
or possession.20 The only provision left 2' is that relating to hazard,
namely: "Unless otherwise provided this company shall not be liable
for loss or damage occuring while the hazard is increased by any means
within the control or knowledge of the insured." 2 It has been held that
placing a mortgage subsequent to the issuance of the policy amounted
in an increase of the hazard voiding the policy under that provision.2 '
This decision has been criticized, and the conclusion reached, that mort-
gaging of insured realty does not constitute a moral hazard sufficient to
void the policy under the hazard provision. Such conclusion was based
on an analysis of the decisions in relation to statutory changes in the
form of the policy and actual inquiry addressed to fire underwriters. 24
From the insurance angle, some distinction between real estate and
chattel mortgages can be inferred from mere inspection of the stand-
"71n the cases of Lynch v. Dalzell, 4 Bro. P.C. 431, 2 Eng. Rep. 292 (1729) and
Sadlers Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554, 555, 26 Eng. Rep. 733 (1743) it was
pointed out that if policies were issued to people having no interest in the
subject matter, a hazardous condition would result. There would be a great
temptation for nefarious commission of willful arson. The idea was expressed
that such would be a public danger. See ANGELL, FIRE AND LIFE INSURANCE(2nd. ed. 1855) § 55.
'8 As long as there is no fraudulent misrepresentation in applying for the policy
(Wis. Stats. [1933] § 203.01 lines 1 to 9 incl.) the only provisions at all ap-
plicable to the act of subsequently encumbering the realty are: the sole owner-
ship clause (id. at lines 23 to 26) ; commencement of foreclosure proceedings
clause (id. at lines 28 to 31 incl.) ; change in interest, title or possession clause(id. at lines 31 to 34 incl.) ; and finally the increase of hazard clause (id. at
lines 38 to 40 incl.).
19Matthews v. Insurance Co., 115 Wis. 272, 91 N.W. 675 (1902); 26 C.J. 234,
243.
20 Wolf v. Insurance Co., 115 Wis. 402, 91 N.W. 1014 (1902); VANCE, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 719 n. 15, 16. Contra: Olney v. Insur-
ance Co., 88 Mich 94, 50 N.W. 100 (1891).2"The provision against foreclosure proceedings (Wis. Stats. [1933] § 203.01
lines 28 to 31 incl.) will not be considered since that provision does not relate
to any problem cencerning moral hazard.
2" Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.01 lines 35 to 40 incl.2"Lcrwvaer v. Globe Ins. Co., 25 S.D. 549, 127 N.W. 615 (1910). Cf. Petranek v.
Bohemian Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 44 S.D. 540, 184 N.W. 798 (1921) reversing
a lower court decision based on the Lawyer case and granting a new trial to
determine as a matter of fact whether the hazard was increased by the placing
of the mortgage. Contra: Huff v. Jewett, 20 Misc. 35, 44 N.Y. Supp. 311(1897) ; see Shns v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 296 Fed. 115 (C.C.A. 6th, 1924);
Cooper v. Insurance Co., 139 Mo. App. 570, 583, 584, 123 S.W. 497 (1909);
Light v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 105 Tenn. 480, 58 S.W. 851 (1900).
•4 Cohen, Encumbering Realty as Affecting the Moral Hazard in Fire Insurance
(1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 603.
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ard policy.25 That distinction from a practical point of view should not
be based on a difference between the realty and chattel mortgagor's
interest in the encumbered property.2 If the character of the insured's
interest in property encumbered by a real estate mortgage does not
constitute a moral hazard,27 neither should the insured's interest in per-
sonal property covered by a chattel mortgage constitute such a hazard.28
The decisions however hold that the placing of a chattel mortgage on
personal property increases the risk, i.e. it creates a moral hazard.29 It
has been suggested that the force of these holdings should be dis-
counted at least insofar as they hold such mortgaging constitutes a
moral hazard as a matter of law.30 The evidence pro and con is bal-
anced; perhaps the tendency to hold that the placing of a chattel mort-
gage gave rise to a moral hazard is founded upon authority established
at a time when the concept of a chattel mortgage was different from
what it is today.3'
Consider now the purpose of the chattel mortgage provision. The
Mielke case stated that it was "inserted to afford the insurer the pro-
25 There is no provision relating directly to the encumbrancing of insured realty
(see note 18 supra) while there is a direct prohibition against chattel mort-
gages (see note 1 supra).2 6Mielke v. National Reserve Ins. Co. (Wis. 1934) 256 N.W. 776, 777. It was
stated that a chattel mortgage not only works a change in title, but subjects
the mortgagor to the prospect of seizure at any time when the mortgagee
deems himself insecure. This is true only where the instrument itself so pro-
vides. For all practical purposes the chattel mortgagor is the owner. He enjoys
the use of the chattel. He is protected in that use against third persons (even
against the mortgagor if there is no special clause like that mentioned above).
Note (1934) Marq. L. Rev. 248, 249, n. 1.
27 See note 24 supra.
28 There is no ground for the fear that in some mysterious way the assured
would derive a profit by insuring the property to its full value, placing a
chattel mortgage on it and then having it destroyed without being detected.
His obligation to repay the mortgage remains in any event. Further in his
proof of loss he is obliged to state his interest and the interests of others in
the property and all encumbrances thereon (Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.01, lines
133 to 140 incl.). From a theoretical or practical viewpoint it is hard to deter-
mine how the assured chattel mortgagor can make a profit. See Cohen, Enclent-
bering Realty as Effecting the Moral Hazard in Fire Insurance (1924) 24 Col.
L. Rev. 603, 613.
29 Ellis v. State Ins. Co., 61 Iowa 577, 16 N.W. 744 (1883) ; Lee v. Agricultural
Ins Co., 79 Iowa 379, 44 N.W. 683 (1890) ; Lipedes v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co.,
229 N.Y. 201, 128 N.E. 160, 13 A.L.R. 556 (1920) (cited in the Mielke case
note 3 supra) ; see Schienritsch v. The American Ins. Co., 48 Wis. 26, 29, 3
N.W. 595 (1879).
3o RIcHARDs, LAW OF INSURANCE (2d. ed. 1893) 151, § 141. Cf. Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Fulton, 80 Ga. 224, 4 S.E. 866 (1887); McCarty v. Imperial Ins. Co., 126
N.C. 820, 36 S.E. 284 (1900).
31 In note 17 supra the effect of "no interest" in the property was shown. It
voided the policy as to such non-interested holder. Howard & Rychiman v.
Albany Ins. Co., 3 Denio 301 (N.Y. 1846). Under the concept of a chattel mort-
gage in England prior to 1820, the mortgagee became so absolutely the owner
of the chattel that the mortgagor was completely lacking in interest. Lock-wood
v. Ewer, 2 Atk. R. 303, 26 Eng. Rep. 585 (1742). This of course voided the
mortgagor's policy. This was changed by the registry act, the mortgagee not
being an owner to any greater extent than the value of the mortgage and the
mortgagor continuing as owner. Irving v. Richardson, 2 B. & Adol. R. 193, 196,
109 Eng. Rep. 1115, 1116 (1831). It is suggested that the rulings which arose
under the old concept of the chattel mortgage have persisted in some form
today and influenced the courts in holding that the chattel mortgage in some
way should void the policy; the moral hazard theory is the old concept dis-
guised.
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tection which it has by reason of the fact that the insured is the owner
and therefore interested in the property. ' 32 Such a reason is based on
the assumption that there is an increase in the risk to the insured, i.e.,
existence of a moral hazard if the property becomes encumbered. The
validity of this assumption, as previously discussed, is doubtful.3 3 The
text book writers have, however, advanced this reason.3 4 Besides this
reason the provision has been upheld on the ground that the parties
are sui juris3 5 It is also suggested that it was inserted because the
clause voiding the policy upon change in interest, title, or possession was
not appliable to that change which whs effected by the execution of a
chattel mortgage.
3 6
Whatever the reason, both legal and factual, may be for the existence
of the chattel mortgage provision, it does exist and must be construed.
Where the chattel mortgage is valid there is no difficulty: it means
that the insured agrees that any personal property incumbered by a
chattel mortgage shall not be within the protection of the policy.3 7 The
Mielke case can be understood to extend this construction to mean
that the insured agrees that any personal property incumbered by a
chattel mortgage whether valid or not shall not be within the protection
of the policy. At least that is one conclusion to be drawn from the case.
But it is not a logical construction. For example in the older form of
policy there was a provision avoiding the policy if other insurance
were placed upon the property.3 If the other insurance so placed was
invalid it did not avoid the existing policies.3 9 In order to insure the re-
quired effect of the subsequent invalid policy the provision was amend-
ed to read whether "valid or not."'40 It would seem that if the legisla-
ture intended that the chattel mortgage provision should apply to valid
as well as invalid mortgages, it would have used language making such
construction definite.4' The decisions construing chattel mortgage pro-
32 See Mielke v. National Reserve Ins. Co. (Wis. 1934) 256 N.W. 776, 777.
33 The care which an owner bestows on his personalty depends to a large extent
on his personal character, it might be said that this care would be lessened
to some degree after the owner has obtained insurance. The act of placing
insurance in this sense itself increases the risk of loss.3 4 VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 713; 4 CoucH
ON INSURANCE 3146.
3 Georgia Home Insurance Co. v. Hoskins, 71 Fla. 282, 71 So. 285 (1916). But
see Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.06 (making the standard policy compulsory). Cf.
Hudson Mfg. Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 33 F. (2d) 460 (C.C.A.
7th, 1929).
36 See Niagara Falls Ins. Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky. 473, 219 S.W. 760, 762 (1927).
37Moe v. Allenzania Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 526, 244 N.W. 593 (1932).
3 8 VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 729.
39Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 86 Ala. 551, 6 So. 143 (1888).
40 See Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.01 lines 201 to 205 incl. If there be other insurance
on the property covered by this policy, whether valid or not, this company shall
not be liable for more than its proportionate share * * * .
41 In Lipedes v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co., 229 N.Y. 201, 128 N.E. 160, 13 A.L.R.
556 (1920), from which the Mielke case derives its authority, the inference is
that there was something in the nature of a fraudulent misrepresentation. The
usurious chattel mortgage was in existence prior to the application for the
policy and the court said did the contract [as a whole] of the parties con-
template the disclosure to the insurance company of the existence of the usu-
rious chattel mortgage. Cf. Madsen v. Farmers and Merchants Insurance Co.,
87 Neb. 107, 126 N.W. 1086 (1910) (concealment of material fact covering
subject of insurance). In that case the court said that whether an alleged
void chattel mortgage was a chattel mortgage or not made no difference as it
constituted an incumbrance and its concealment was material.
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visions where void chattel mortgages are involved are few,4 2 and of
little help in considering the problem. The case of Lipedes v. Liverpool,
etc., Ins. Co.,43 which holds that a void chattel mortgage avoids the
policy, seems more in point than any. Most of the other cases involv-
ing an alleged invalid chattel mortgage turn on some point which does
not squarely bring up the issue, such as chattel mortgages which have
never taken effect because of no delivery" or were valid as between the
parties but void as to creditors.45 There are also some cases inferring
that a void chattel mortgage is not within the chattel mortgage pro-
vision. 6
Construed as above the Mielke case is not sound nor logical. The
only other possible construction would be that the alleged moral hazard
created by the void chattel mortgage is such a hazard as would come
under the following provision: unless otherwise provided * * * this
company shall not be liable for loss or damage occurring while the
hazard is increased by any means within the control * * * of the in-
sured * * *.47 There is some justification for this construction"8 but
the cases generally do not support the view that moral hazard comes
within the purview of the hazard provision. 9 Under the hazard pro-
vision it is possible that a void chattel mortgage would avoid the entire
policy.50 Hence a void chattel mortgage would be more disastrous to the
insured than a valid chattel mortgage which only exempts the mort-
gaged property from the policy.0 1
In conclusion it is suggested that by amendment to the chattel mort-
gage clause, changing it so that in place of voiding the policy entirely5 2
it merely exempted from the policy that property which was incum-
bered,53 the legislature intended to make the insurance attitude toward
chattel mortages conform more closely to modem business practices
and that the pronouncement set forth in the Mielke case is a step back-
ward rather than forward.
GERRIT D. FOSTER.
42 See Note 13 A.L.R. 556.
43 229 N.Y. 201, 128,N.E. 160, 13 A.L.R. 556 (1920). The case is not clear as to
whether the policy was avoided under the chattel mortgage provision or the
hazard provision.
"4 COUCH oN INSURANCE 3134 n. 7. (The mortgagor knew they were invalid
because he had not signified his intent to make them valid.)
45 Secrest v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 68 S.C. 378, 47 S.E. 680 (1903). (Chat-
tel mortgage declared null and void in creditors bill) ; Oliker v. Willianms Fire
Ins. Co., 72 W.Va. 436, 78 S.E. 746 (1913) (trust deed void as to creditors
not parties).46 Beckley v. National Fire Insurance Co., 194 Ia. 1106, 190 N.W. 954 (1922);
Rowland v. Home Ins. Co., 82 Kan. 220, 108 P. 118 (1910).
47 Wis. Stats. (1933) § 203.01 lines 35-40 incl. See note 43 supra.
48 Lawyer v. Globe Mit. Ins. Co., 25 S.D. 549, 127 N.W. 615 (1910) (realty mort-
gage).49 Awrpersand Hotel Co. v .Home Ins. Co., 198 N.Y. 495, 91 N.E. 1099 (1910);
see Cohen, Encumbering Realty as Affecting the Moral Hazard in Fire Insur-
ance (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 603, 618. Cf. Statutory Interpretation (1934)
8 Tulane L. Rev. 306, (Louisiana statute provides for voiding policy for a
breach of warranty as would increase the moral hazard.)
50 The hazard provision provides that the company shall not be liable for dam-
age or loss while the hazard is increased.
51 See notes 2 and 3 supra.
52 Wis. LAws (1895) c. 387 s. 1.
53 Wis. LAws (1917) c. 127 s. 2; see Prentiss-Wabers S. Co. v. Millers Mut. Fire
Ins. Ass'n.. 192 Wis. 623, 627, 211 N.W. 776, 778 (1927).
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